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On June 22, 1964, the Supreme Court's decision
in Escobedo v. Illinois became part of the "law of
the land". The case focused upon the oblique,
many-faceted constitutional problem of modern
criminal procedure: incommunicado police interro-
gation of suspected criminals versus the right of per-
sons suspected of crime to assistance of counsel at
the police investigation level of a criminal case.
Implicit in the problem are at least two others: the
requirement that confessions be voluntary and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 2 Beyond those
of constitutional dimensions and not always ex-
tricable from them are a network of practical, per-
vasive problems concerning law enforcement tech-
niques, getting convictions, fighting them and
equipping defendants with a lawyer at the earliest
moment in the adversary system to effectively
challenge exertions of governmental power.
3
Escobedo provoked national attention, as it
should have. Newspapers and other media widely
reported the case, often with condemning com-
ments from police, prosecuting officials and others
with police-oriented views on "effective" law en-
forcement. These spokesmen characterized the
case as another example of the Court's "turn 'em
1378 U. S. 478 (1964).
2 The right to counsel at the trial itself is intimately
related but severable. See Vorenberg, Police Detention
and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Su-
preme Court and the States, 44 BOSTON U. L. REV.
423, 429 (1964).
3 The concept of challenge as a necessary ingredient
of the adversary system has been articulated in the
Report of the Attorney General's Commiltee on Poverty
anud the Adninistration of Criminal Justice (1963).
"The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The
survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances depends upon a constant, searching,
and creative questioning of official decisions and asser-
tions of authority at all stages of the process." Id. at
10. The Report led to passage of the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, implementing the case of Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458 (1938), some 26 years later.
loose" philosophy,4 a crippling new restriction
governing the taking and use of criminal confes-
sions.5 They accused the Court of hamstringing
law enforcement by bringing defense lawyers into
an important police workshop-the interrogation
room.
Now that the decision has a toe-hold on our
general concept of Due Process of Law, vague
though it may be, the criticism and the problems
deserve analysis, for it may be, as Mr. Justice
White admonished in his dissenting opinion,
"another major step in the direction of the goal
which the Court seemingly has in mind-to bar
from evidence all admissions obtained from an in-
dividual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily
made or not."6
The issues hereafter discussed, namely the judi-
cial evolution of the Escobedo case in terms of the
struggle within the Court, identification of some of
the issues Escobedo spins off (such as doing away
with extrajudicial confessions altogether, as Mr.
Justice White fears), and the suggestion to employ
Supreme Court Rules and to involve the Congress
of the United States in state criminal procedure
through its enactment of a Title or Code of four-
teenth amendment criminal procedure (to resolve
not only right to counsel problems but other old,
new and future fourteenth amendment problems of
state criminal procedure), are best bottomed upon
a full understanding of the facts-the "circum-
stances"-of the Escobedo case. For the majority
in Escobedo, some broad language to the contrary
notwithstanding, expressly decided this case and
4 The phrase belongs to Professor Fred E. Inbau. See
Gowran, Tell How Acts of High Court Impede Police,
Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 9, Part 3.
5 See Gowran, How Supreme Court Ruling Puts
Straitjacket on Police, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1964,
p. 27.
6 378 U. S. 478, 495 (1964).
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not the next one that will come along under differ-
ent circumstances.
THE FACTS oF ESCOBEDO
The issue before the Court was stated in the
opinion of the majority, written by Mr. Justice
Goldberg:
"The critical question in this case is
whether, under the circumstances, the re-
fusal by the police to honor petitioner's re-
quest to consult with his lawyer during the
course of an interrogation constitutes a denial
of 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
'made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, and thereby renders
inadmissible in a state criminal trial any in-
criminating statement elicited by the police
during the interrogation."'
On the night of January 19, 1960, Danny
Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatally shot. At
2:30 a.m. on the following morning, Escobedo was
arrested by police without a warrant and interro-
gated about the shooting. He made no statement
to the police and was released from custody at 5:00
p.m. that afternoon pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus obtained by a lawyer whom he had earlier
retained to prosecute a personal injury action.
Ten days later, on January 30, between 8:00 and
9:00 p.m., Escobedo was arrested again and
brought to police headquarters. The second arrest
resulted from a statement made earlier that day by
one Benedict DiGerlando, who was in custody at
Chicago police headquarters in connection with the
killing. DiGerlando, who was to become Escobedo's
co-defendant, told the police that Escobedo had
committed the murder.
At the time of this second arrest Escobedo was
handcuffed behind his back. On the way to police
headquarters the police told him that DiGerlando
had named him as the killer. He was also told that
he and DiGerlando were hooked-up with the killing
('pretty tight" and that he might as well "admit
to this crime." Escobedo responded by saying, "I
am sorry, but I would like to have advice from my
lawyer."s
Shortly after Escobedo was taken into Chicago
police headquarters his retained lawyer arrived.
The lawyer asked the desk sergeant for permission
7 Id. at 479.
8Id.
to speak to his client. This was between 9:30 and
10:00 p.m. The desk sergeant made a call, found
out that Escobedo was in the Homicide Bureau,
and told Homicide that a lawyer wanted to see
Escobedo. The desk sergeant then turned to the
lawyer and told him he could not see Escobedo.
The lawyer went upstairs to the Homicide Bu-
reau where he found several Homicide detectives.
He told them that he was Escobedo's lawyer and
wanted to see him. The detectives referred him to
the Chief. The Chief told him he couldn't see
Escobedo because they hadn't finished questioning
him. That was at approximately 11:00 p.m. At
about that time the lawyer caught a glimpse of his
client through an open door in the Homicide Bu-
reau, waved to him, and Escobedo waved back. At
the hearing on the motion to supress the confession
Escobedo testified that he took the lawyer's wave
as a signal not to say anything.9 Then one of the
police officers closed that door. The lawyer waited
around for another hour or two, repeating his re-
quest to see Escobedo. All these requests were de-
nied and the lawyer finally left without an oppor-
tunity to speak to his client. Escobedo, meanwhile,
behind the closed door in the Homicide Bureau,
made repeated requests to see his lawyer, all of
which were denied. He was also told by the police
that his lawyer did not want to see him.
During the course of the interrogation Di-
Gerlando was brought in and pointed the finger of
guilt at Escobedo. Escobedo told DiGerlando that
he was "lying" and said "I didn't shoot Manuel,
you did it." As the Supreme Court noted, in this
way, for the first time, the police succeeded in
getting Escobedo to admit some knowledge of the
crime. Further incriminating admissions were
thereafter made.1" An assistant State's Attorney
was called in. He took a formal statement from
Escobedo. Neither the assistant State's Attorney
nor the police ever advised Escobedo of his "con-
stitutional rights".
9Id. at 480, n. 1. "Petitioner testified that this
ambiguous gesture 'could have meant most anything,'
but that he 'took it upon [his] own to think that [the
lawyer was telling him] not to say anything,' and the
lawyer 'wanted to talk' to him."
10 Id. at 483. It was also noticed by the Court that a
police officer, Montejano, was employed to ply Esco-
bedo. They had grown up together in the same neigh-
borhood. Escobedo testified that Montejano promised
him he could go home if he pinned the murder on Di-
Gerlando.
" At the time of the arrest there was a statute in
force in Illinois providing that "all public officers...
having custody of any person ... for any alleged cause
whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of
[Vol. 56
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Escobedo was indicted for murder. His motions
to suppress the incriminating statements, made be-
fore and during the trial, were denied. The state-
ment was admitted in evidence and the conviction
followed. He was sentenced to twenty years in the
Illinois penitentiary."
"Tim LAW OF Tax LAmN"
In delivering what Professor Inbau described as
the "hardest body blow the court has struck yet
against enforcement of law in this nation,"" the
Court said:
"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, [1]
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect, [2] the suspect has
been taken into police custody, [3] the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,
[4] the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and [5] the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to re-
main silent, the accused has been denied 'the
Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution as 'made ob-
ligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.,
at 342, and that no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial."' 4
This is a marathon sentence worth more than one
reading. But it is not, in and of itself, the hardest
judicial body blow yet struck against law enforce-
ment. The Supreme Court did do some hamstring-
escape, admit any practicing attorney at law of this
state, whom such person so restrained of his liberty
may desire to see or consult, to see and consult with
such person so imprisoned, alone and in private, at
the jail or other place of custody." Ill. Rev. Stat.
1961, Ch. 38, par. 736 (b)-(c). The provision has been
replaced by Sec. 103-4 of the Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963. Escobedo's lawyer called the atten-
tion of the police to the statute, but they were ob-
viously not impressed. See People v. Escobedo, 190
N.E. 2d 825 (Ill. 1963). The New York Court of Ap-
pels gave force to a similar statute, as the Court in
.Escobedo noted, in People v. Donovan, 193 N.E. 2d
628 (N. Y. 1963), by holding the confession taken in
violation of it to be invalid.
For a comment on People v. Escobedo, 190 N.E.
2d 825 (Ill. 1963), written before the decision under
discussion, see Note, Criminal Law-Right to Counsel,
52 ILL. BAR J. 602 (March, 1963).
za Gowran, How Supreme Court Ruling .Puts Straight-
jacket on Police, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1964, p. 27.
14 378 U. S. 478, 490-491 (1964).
ing. But the relevant question is: shouldn't this
ham have been strung? The traditional conflict be-
tween judicial protection of individual rights under
the fourteenth amendment, on the one hand, and
protection of society's legitimate interest in bring-
ing criminals to bar on the other, is inevitably at
play here. Also present was the wave of dissatis-
faction following any Supreme Court decision
newly articulating a fair play rule which operates in
favor of the accused, especially an accused charged
with murder and, necessarily, convicted of it. When
the fires of public zeal start to subside, as they gen-
erally do, some analysis and projection of the im-
pact of the case-particularly this case-upon the
future administration of the criminal process is in
order. The fires ahead, from the projectory of the
present, seem more fierce than the one now smold-
ering from Escobedo.
In deciding Escobedo, contrary to some popular
belief, the Supreme Court did not hold a wake for
policemen; it did not bury the confession; nor did
it alter basic principles of law enforcement. The de-
cision did take up some of the slack which some
police have heretofore enjoyed in the interrogation
of criminal suspects.
Taking the decision in its own context, it barred
the use in evidence of a statement taken from a
man under arrest and held in custody as a suspect
for a particular crime while he was denied his re
quest to consult with his lawyer and, at the same
time, not effectively warned of his right to remain
silent. Hostility to Escobedo--as distinct from hos-
tility to what echo Escobedo may toll in future de-
cisions-is directly proportional to one's belief
that it is fair play to obtain incriminating state-
ments from a prisoner while actively keeping him
from his lawyer and failing to warn him of his abso-
lute constitutional right to remain silent. Escobedo
can be stated quasi-syllogistically: the constitu-
tional right to assistance of counsel under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments gaurantees a criminal
suspect under arrest and police interrogation for a
specific crime the opportunity to consult with his
lawyer upon request, at least when he has not been
effectively warned of his absolute right to remain
silent. Escobedo was a criminal suspect under
arrest and police interrogation for a specific crime
who was not effectively warned of his absolute right
to remain silent and who was denied the oppor-
tunity to consult with his lawyer despite his re-
quest. Therefore, Escobedo was denied his right to
195
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assistance of counsel under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments.'"
The foregoing statement of what I believe
Escobedo held is, to be sure, an attempt to strap
down the law of the case. Broader interpretations
are possible, but my own experience in arguing
Escobedo in the Illinois trial courts has led me to
settle for the holding as I have stated it and as it
has been interpreted by a near score of states, in-
cluding the Supreme Court of Illinois decision in
People v. Hartgraves.16
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE COURT
The decision in Escobedo extending the right to
counsel to the police interrogation room under cer-
tain circumstances did not just happen; it followed
a tenacious and persistent refusal by minority
members of the Court to accept the oft-repeated
stand of the majority, as articulated in Betts v.
Brady17 in 1942, that the right to counsel was not
an absolute constitutional requirement under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The persistence of the old minority (most always
Justices Black, Warren, Douglas and Brennan) in
cases like In Re Groban,18 Crooker v. California,19
Cicenia v. Lagay,'0 and the more neutral decision
in Spano v. New York"l was vindicated by a
change in the Court's composition and the deci-
sion in Gideon v. Wainwright" in 1963. Thereafter
the old minority, now joined by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, emerged with the decisions in Massiah v.
United States'3 and Escobedo v. Illinois.
"5 The question left open is whether Escobedo would
be decided the same way if one further fact is intro-
duced-telling the suspect 'effectively' that he has an
absolute right to remain silent. I understand that some
Assistant State's Attorneys in Cook County, the home
of Escobedo, are now 'effectively' warning suspects by
reading the fifth amendment to them in its original,
unexpurgated form. Which goes to another question:
is Escobedo a self-incrimination case in its import? If
so, what constitutes an 'effective' warning? See n. 8,
supra. In his dissent in Escobedo Justice White said:
... Danny Escobedo knew full well that he need not
answer and knew full well that his lawyer had advised
him not to answer." 378 U. S. 478 at 499.
16 202 N.E. 2d 33 (Ill. 1964).
17 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
18 352 U. S. 330 (1957).
19 357 U. S. 433 (1958).
20 357 U. S. 504 (1958).
1360 U. S. 315 (1959).
372 U. S. 335 (1959). The decision in Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963), is also part of the
prelude to the Escobedo decision. In fact, if the essence
of the involuntariness in Haynes was the denial of the
request to call the wife and the attorney during the
incommunicado police detention, one may say that
Escobedo is an articulation in sixth amendment terms
of what had already been held in Haynes.
_3377 U. S. 201 (1964).
These decisions are hereafter considered in some
detail, not for the purpose of adding to the already
formidable body of comment on them,24 but to get
across the flavor of the controversy, the deep-
rooted issues underlying the controversy, and to
lay the groundwork for a suggestion hereinafter
made to modernize our machinery for meeting the
due process and equal protection challenges of the
fourteenth amendment.
The sixth amendment's guarantee that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense", was brought into play as an ingredient of
fourteenth amendment due process for the first
time in 1932, in Powell v. Alabama.s5 In Powell a
group of young negro boys received the death
penalty for raping two white girls. The Court held
that in a capital case, where the defendants are un-
able by reason of illiteracy, feeble mindedness or
other circumstances, to conduct their own defense,
a state court has a duty, whether requested or not,
to assign counsel to defendants unable to employ
their own. 26 Under such circumstances assignment
of counsel was held to be "a necessary requisite of
due process of law."''3
A decade later, in 1942, the battle lines were
drawn within the Supreme Court on the issue of the
right to have counsel assigned to an impecunious
defendant in a non-capital state criminal prosecu-
tion. In Belts v. Brady,28 the defendant, tried for
robbery in Maryland, was denied an appointed
lawyer despite his lack of funds to employ counsel.
His conviction was affirmed in a 6-3 decision ar-
ticulating that the sixth amendment applies only to
4 For the history of right to counsel up to the cases
herein discussed, see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERIcAN COURTS (1955). See also, The Right to
Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. (1961).
2" 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
26 In Powell v. Alabama there were two grounds on
which the Court set aside the conviction: first, the
trial court failed to give defendants a reasonable time
and opportunity to secure counsel; second, ".... under
the circumstances... [the ignorance and illiteracy of
defendants, the imprisonment and close surveillance,
that they were from another state without friends or
family,] the necessity of counsel was so vital and im-
perative that the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial
of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 287 U. S. 45, 71. The right to counsel
in capital cases became indisputably absolute-if it
had not been already-in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U. S. 52 (1961), where the Court said "When one
pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel,
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice re-
sulted." Id. at 55.
287 U. S. 45, 71 (1932).
20 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
[Vol. 56
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federal criminal trials, but a "fundamental fair-
ness" rule was also announced:
"Asserted denial [of due process of law by
reason of putting a man on trial without a
lawyer) is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which
may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the uni-
versal sense of justice, may, in other circum-
stances, and in the light of other considera-
tions, fall short of such denial."-'
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas
and Murphy, wrote a dissenting opinion in which
he said "I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
made the Sixth applicable to the States. '30 And he
made another point which has since taken deep
root as a test of fair criminal procedure-"No man
shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his
poverty. Any other practice seems to me to defeat
the promise of our democratic society to provide
equal justice under the law."'"
The division within the Court over the issue of
the right to have trial counsel assigned to impecu-
nious defendants in state felony prosecutions con-
tinued in a number of cases, but until Gideon v.
Wainwrigh: was decided in 1963, the right to
counsel cases before the Court between Betts and
Gidem sometimes centered upon different issues.
In a 5-4 decision, In Re Groban,n the Court held
that a witness compelled to testify at a state in-
vestigative proceeding conducted by the Ohio State
Fire Marshal to investigate the causes of fire had no
constitutional right to have his lawyer present. The
Court said:
"The fact that appellants were under a legal
duty to speak and that their testimony might
provide a basis for criminal charges against
them, does not mean that they had a consti-
tutional right to the assistance of their counsel.
***When such charges are made in a criminal
proceeding, he may then demand the presence
of his counsel for his defense. Until then his
protection is the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation...."1
In support of this holding, the Court drew an
analogy to the plight of the grand jury witness who
has no right to representation by his counsel before
the grand jury.3'
29 Id. at 462.
N Id. at 474.
31Id. at 477.
372 U. S. 335 (1963).
-352 U. S. 330 (1957).
uId. at 332, 333.
aThe Court relied upon three lower court deci-
Mr. Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion
(joined by Justices Warren, Douglas and Brennan),
arguing that the majority opinion was a "complete
departure from our traditional methods of law en-
forcement"36 and in disregard of the principle laid
down in Powell v. Alabama, that an accused "re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceeding against him".n The dissent also re-
flected a deep distrust of all secret interrogation-
the "extraction of 'statements' by one means or
another from an individual by officers of the state
while he is held incommunicado". 38 Justice Black
said:
"I... firmly believe that the Due Process
Clause requires that a person interrogated be
allowed to use legal counsel whenever he is
compelled to give testimony to law enforce-
ment officers which may be instrumental
in his prosecution and conviction for a criminal
offense." 9
In Re Groban was decided in 1957. The next year
the first two cases dealing with the Escobedo issue,
that is, the right to consult an attorney during
police interrogation, were decided by the Court, in
both instances by a bare majority. Crooker v. Cali-
cisions in support of this proposition: In Re Black,
47 F. 2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Blaton,
77 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.Mo. 1948); and United States v.
Scully, 225 F. 2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955). The dissenters as-
sumed the accuracy of the proposition but argued that
the analogy was wrong. They said that a witness before
a traditional grand jury of 12-23 members received
protection from the grand jurors from official mis-
representations or abuse. 352 U. S. 330, 347.
6 352 U. S. at 338.
n The popular statement of Mr. Justice Sutherland
in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68-69 (1932), is as
follows: "The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he has a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence."
Mr. Justice Sutherland's statement still has rele-
vance to the misdemeanor cases, where no fourteenth
amendment right to counsel for defendants financially
unable to employ counsel yet exists. Borrowing from
Professor Blum, when it comes to taxes a dollar is a
dollar, when it comes to criminal law a day in jail is a
day in jail.
38 352 U. S. 330, 353.
39 Id. at 344.
19651
DONALD C. DOWLING
fornia40 involved a 31 year old defendant, a college
graduate who had studied a year of law. He had
been convicted of murdering his lover and had been
sentenced to death. At the time of his arrest
Crooker was taken to a Los Angeles police station.
He asked the police if he could call a lawyer whom
he believed would represent him. His request to
contact an attorney was refused until the police
completed their investigation. A few hours of police
interrogation followed and Crooker fully confessed
the crime. The majority, rejecting the claim that
use of the confession in evidence violated due proc-
ess because it was obtained after Crooker's request
to contact his attorney, said:
"Petitioner, however, contends that a differ-
ent rule should determine whether there has
been a violation of right to counsel. He would
have every state denial of a request to contact
counsel be an infringement of the consti-
tutional right without regard to the circum-
stances of the case. In the absence of any con-
fession, plea or waiver, or other event preju-
dicial to the accused-such a doctrine would
create a complete anomoly, since nothing
would remain that could be corrected on new
trial. Refusal by state authorities to contact
counsel necessarily would then be an absolute
bar to conviction. On the other hand, where an
event has occurred while the accused was with-
out his counsel which fairly promises to ad-
versely affect his chances, the doctrine sug-
gested by petitioner would have a lesser but
still devastating effect on enforcement of
criminal law, for it would effectively preclude
police questioning-fair as well as unfair-
until the accused was afforded opportunity to
call his attorney. Due process ... demands
no such rule."'
The same four Justices who dissented in In Re
Groban also dissented in Crooker and again the deep
distrust of police practices in obtaining confessions
was stated, this time by Mr. Justice Douglas:
"The right to have counsel at the pre-trial
stage is often necessary to give meaning and
protection to the right to be heard at the trial
itself.*** It may also be necessary as a re-
straint on the coercive power of the police.
The pattern of the third degree runs through
our cases.*** The third degree flourishes only
in secrecy. One who feels the need of a lawyer
40 357 U. S. 433 (1958).
41 Id. at 440, 441.
and asks for one is asking for some protection
which the law can give him against a coerced
confession.*** We should not lower the bar-
riers and deny the accused any procedural
safeguard against coercive police practices. The
trial on the issue of coercion is seldom help-
ful. Law officers usually testify one way, the
accused another. The citizen who has been the
victim of these secret inquisitions has little
chance to prove coercion. The mischief and
abuse of the third degree will continue as long
as an accused can be denied the right to coun-
sel at this most critical period of his ordeal. For
what takes place in the secret confines of the
police station may be more critical than what
takes place at the trial.*** The demands of
our civilization expressed in the Due Process
Clause require that the accused who wants a
counsel should have one at any time after the
moment of arrest." 42
It is apparent, therefore, and of no small sig-
nificance, that the minority in Crooker were advo-
cating the right to counsel at any time after arrest
as an absolute constitutional requirement; but
when Mr. Justice Goldberg, with this minority,
wrote the decision in Escobedo, the old "circum-
stances" rule of Betts v. Brady was used, not the
"absolute requirement" rule urged by the dissent-
ers in Crooker.0
Id. at 443-448.
43 As has been noted, the Escobedo decision states
the issue in terms of the "circumstances" of the case.
The Court defined those circumstances in stating its
holding. And in concluding the opinion, the Court
said: "We hold only that when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the
accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our
adversary system begins to operate, and, uender the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer." (378 U. S. 478, 492) (Em-
phasis added.) In discussing Crooker v. California,
the Court said: "In that case the Court merely re-
jected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that
'every state denial of a request to contact counsel [is]
an infringement of the constitutional right without
regard to the circumstances of the case.'" (Emphasis in
original.) The Court also said that Crooker 'does not
compel a contrary result," arguing that among "the
critical circumstances which distinguish that case from
this one are that the petitioner there, but not here,
was explicitly advised by the police of his constitu-
tional right to remain silent and not to 'say anything'
in response to the questions ... ." Id. 491-492.
The fact that Crooker had had a year of law school
was also noted (and would appear significant in con-
cluding that Crooker had been 'effectively' warned of
his absolute right to remain silent.)
Considered in this light-as, indeed, the case must
be-it would be erroneous to conclude that Escobedo
creates an absolute right to counsel during police
[Vol. 56
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Cicenia v. Lagay,4 the other case that was handed
down with Crooker, added another dimension to the
problem. In place of the year of law school, Cicenia
actually had retained a lawyer. After retaining
counsel, Cicenia went voluntarily to police head-
quarters in Orange, New Jersey, having heard that
the police sought him for questioning in connection
with an unsolved robbery-murder. The police took
him to headquarters at Newark and at about 2:00
p.m., some five hours after Cicenia submitted
himself to questioning, the retained lawyer ap-
peared at the Newark station and was refused per-
mission to see his client. Throughout the afternoon
the police continued to refuse the lawyer's and
Cicenia's requests for a conference with one an-
other. By 9:30 p.m., when they were finally al-
lowed to confer, Cicenia had signed a confession
to the murder.
The case is strikingly similiar to Escobedo v. Illi-
nois.4 5 And the issues of Escobedo-the requirement
that confessions be voluntary, the privilege against
self-incrimination, the practical advantages of in-
terrogation as a crime detection tool, the constitu-
tional right to counsel and its proper place in the
adversary system-were not at all unknown to the
majority when it said:
"The contention that petitioner had a con-
stitutional right to confer with counsel is dis-
posed of by Crooker v. California.... Because
the present case, in which petitioner was de-
nied an opportunity to confer with the lawyer
whom he had already retained, sharply points
up the constitutional issue involved, some
additional observations are in order....
"A satisfactory formula for reconciling [the
competing concerns of right to counsel and the
ability of the police to solve crimes] ... is not
to be found in any broad pronouncement that
one must yield to the other in all instances.
Instead, as we point out in Crooker v. Cali-
fornia... in judging whether state prosecu-
tions meet the requirements of due process,
[this Court] has sought to achieve a proper ac-
interrogation of a criminal suspect. "Effective" warn-
ing of the right to remain silent may still be open as an
alternative to letting in the lawyer pounding at the
jailhouse door.
357 U. S. 504 (1958).
41 Cicenia and Escobedo both had seen their lawyers
before the interrogation and therefore had an oppor-
tunity to be warned of their absolute right to remain
silent. Then, after police interrogation began, both
lawyers were refused permission to see their clients at
police headquarters, and both clients were denied
their requests to see their lawyers.
commodation by considering a defendant's
lack of counsel one pertinent element in de-
termining from all the circumstances whether
a conviction was attended by fundamental un-
fairness....
"In contrast, petitioner would have us hold
that any state denial of a defendant's request
to confer with counsel during police question-
ing violates due process .... Such a holding,
in its ultimate reach, would mean that state
police could not interrogate a suspect before
giving him an opportunity to secure coun-
sel."
4 6
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, regretted that
the Court did not take this case and Crooker "as
the occasion to bring our decisions into tune with
the constitutional requirement for fair criminal
proceedings against the citizen."4
I have referred to Spano v. New York,45 decided
in 1959, as a more "neutral" decision because
there the Court unanimously held the confession
in question involuntary and the case was disposed
of on that issue. Spano also confessed to murder
after having been repeatedly refused permission to
see his lawyer. Here, however, the confession fol-
lowed the indictment and Spano argued that his
absolute right to counsel in a capital case,
relying on Powell v. Alabama, became operative
on the return of the indictment, and on that
ground he sought to distinguish Crooker and
Cicenia.49 The contention was not reached by the
majority because of the Court's finding that the
confession was involuntary under traditional four-
teenth amendment principles, but Justice Douglas,
joined by Justices Black and Brennan, did con-
sider Spano's contention:
"While I join the opinion of the Court, I
add what for me is an even more important
ground of decision.
46 357 U. S. 504, 508, 509 (1958).
-' 357 U. S. 504, 512 (1958).
46 360 U. S. 315 (1959).
49 As stated by the Court, "Petitioner's first con-
tention is that his absolute right to counsel in a capital
case, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, became operative
on the return of the indictment against him, for at that
time he was in every sense a defendant in a criminal
case.... He argues accordingly that following indict-
ment no confession obtained in the absence of counsel
can be used without violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." (360 U. S. 315, 320.) Assuming that the right
to counsel in state cases is co-extensive with the
right to counsel in federal cases, the contention would
.now be valid under Massiah v. United States, 377
U. S. 201 (1964). But see Turner v. State, 384 S.W.




"We have often divided on whether state
authorities may question a suspect for hours
on end when he has no lawyer present and
when he has demanded that he have the bene-
fit of legal advice.... But here we deal not
with a suspect but with a man who has been
formally charged with a crime. The question
is whether after the indictment and before the
trial the Government can interrogate the ac-
cused in secret when he has asked for his lawyer
and when his request was denied.***
"We do not have here mere suspects who
are being secretly interrogated by the police
as in Crooker v. California.. .nor witnesses who
are being questioned in secret administrative
or judicial proceedings as in In Re Groban....
This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled
to be tried by a judge and jury, being tried in
a preliminary way by the police. This is a
kangaroo court procedure.... They in effect
deny him effective representation by coun-
sel....
"[Wihat use is a defendant's right to effec-
tive counsel at every stage of a criminal case
if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be




The ascension of Justices Goldberg and White
to the Court, succeeding Justices Frankfurter and
Whittaker, was followed by the unanimous over-
ruling of Belts v. Brady, in 1963, in Gideon v.
Wainwright,51 the two cases being "nearly indis-
tinguishable" on their facts. The opinion of the
Court was written by Mr. Justice Black, the author
of the dissent in Betts twenty-one years earlier.
Conspicuously absent from Justice Black's opinion
in Gideon, however, was the notion he had ad-
vanced in Belts that equal protection of the law
demanded equipping impoverished defendants
with counsel. Adding to the conspicuousness was
the moratorium on "invidious discriminations"
Black had talked about in Griffin v. Illinois52 when
he said: "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."' ' But due process of law is a
more regulable doctrine than equal protection; it
can be cut off where the a priori deductions of
50 360 U. S. 315, 324-326 (1959).
51372 U. S. 335 (1963).
S351 U. S. 12, 17 (1956).
Sld. at 19.
equal protection cannotA' Perhaps in recognition
of this, perhaps for the sake of unanimity, the
new look on the sixth amendment came via the
due process clause of the fourteenth:
"We accept Belts v. Brady's assumption,
based as it was on prior cases, that a provision
of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental
and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. We think the Court in Belts was wrong,
however, in concluding that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of counsel is not one of those
fundamental rights.***
"The fact is that in deciding as it did
-that 'appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial'
-the Court in Belts v. Brady made an abrupt
break with its own well-considered precedents.
In returning to these old precedents, sounder
we believe than the new, we but restore con-
stitutional principles established to achieve a
fair system of justice.*** The Court in Betts
v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom
upon which the Court's holding in Powell v.
Alabama rested." 55
THE EMERGENCE
The persistent right to counsel doctrine of the
old minority first emerged a majority doctrine on
May 18, 1964, in Massiah v. United States.5 6 The
"occasion" for bringing the law "into tune with
the constitutional requirement for fair criminal
proceedings against the citizen" was a federal
narcotics case. After Massiah had been indicted
he retained his own lawyer and was released on
bail. Federal narcotics agents, with the aid of a
Schmidt kit and Massiah's co-defendant-turned
54It is interesting to note that while the cases on
right to counsel at and before the trial itself have been
decided on due process grounds, right to counsel after
the trial, on the first appeal, was decided on equal
protection grounds. See Douglas v. California, 372
U. S. 353 (1963). Here there is no firm base for the
constitutional distinction like there is in the free-
transcript cases, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956);
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U. S. 487
(1958); Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963); Draper
v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); and the filing-fee
case, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961). In the
transcript cases and the filing-fee case, equal protection
grounds are rational because one cannot get review-
in any way, shape or form-without the transcript
or the fee. But in the right-to-counsel-on-appeal case,
the appeal was accessible to the indigent, though
without a lawyer.
55 372 U. S. 335, 342-345 (1963).
56 377 U. S. 201 (1964).
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informer, then sought to obtain incriminating ad-
missions from him. The agents installed a radio
transmitter in the co-defendant's car; the co-de-
fendant picked up Massiah and had a conversation
with him in the car; Massiah talked too much;
the agents overheard him through their receiving
device and testified to what they overheard at the
trial. Mr. Justice Stewart, in delivering the opinion
of the Court, resurrected and vitalized the sepa-
rate concurring opinions in Spano v. New York,
holding that the sixthi amendment had been vio-
lated. It can be assumed, therefore, that a combi-
nation of the Gideon and Massiah opinions make
the Massiah rule equally applicable to state crim-
inal cases.' 7
The Court's unanimity in Gideon, however,
dissipated in Massiah. Mr. Justice White wrote
a powerful dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Clark and Harlan, in which it was said:
"It is only a sterile syllogism-an unsound
one, besides-to say that because Massiah had
a right to counsel's aid before and during the
trial, his out-of-court conversations and ad-
missions must be excluded if obtained without
counsel's consent or presence. The right to
counsel has never meant as much before,
Cicenia v. Lagay.. .Crooker v. California...
and its extension in this case requires some
further explanation, so far unarticulated by
the Court.***
"This is nothing more than a thinly dis-
guised constitutional policy of minimizing or
entirely prohibiting the use in evidence of
voluntary out-of-court admissions and confes-
sions made by the accused. Carried as far as
blind logic may compel some to go, the notion
.. would have a severe and unfortunate im-
pact upon the great bulk of criminal cases."5
The dissenters in Massiah lamented that the
Court's "newly fashioned exclusionary principle"59
picks up where the fifth amendment ends. And
they forecast that the Court's reasoning-the ab-
sence of counsel at the time the admissions were
made--would be pertinent to an array of future
problems such as when the right to counsel at-
67 On the theory that the right to counsel in the
state courts is co-extensive with the right to counsel
in the federal courts. See Harvey v. Mississippi, (No.
22005), where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the Gideon rule required
the logical extension of the right to counsel to state
misdemeanor cases.
58 377 U. S. 201, 209 (1964).
69 Id. at 209.
taches, the disposition of the "fruits" of admissions
obtained in violation of the new rule, its appli-
cability to state criminal cases and its retroactive
potential.60 That Massiah has opened the door to
a decade or more of new problems for the state
and federal courts does not appear to be subject
to dispute.
One month after Massiah the Escobedo case
came down, depositing some fill in the judicial
interstices and giving some "further explanation".
Crooker was distinguished. In that case the de-
fendant had studied criminal law and the police
had advised him of his right to remain silent."
And Cicetiia, being disposed of on the basis of
Crooker, added nothing to it. "In any event,"
said the opinion in Escobedo, "to the extent that
Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the
principles announced today, they are not to be
regarded as controlling."62 The indictment-the
formal charge-was not the magic touchstone
determining when the right to counsel attaches:
"It would exalt form over substance to
make the right to counsel, under these circum-
stances, depend on whether at the time of the
interrogation, the authorities had secured a
formal indictment. Petitioner had, for all prac-
tical purposes, already been charged with
murder."6 3
AsSISTING TiE FOURTEENTH AMENDmENT
PROLIXUS
Three separate dissenting opinions were written
in Escobedo. Mr. Justice White, joined by Justices
Clark and Harlan, interpreted the Court's action
as an "abandoning of the voluntary-involuntary
test for admissibility of confessions,"" and there-
fore an unwarranted usurpation of powers not
delegated to the Court. In attacking the decision
as a "new American judge's rule"65 applicable to
both state and federal courts, "a rule wholly un-
workable and impossible to administer unless
police cars are equipped with public defenders", 6
Mr. Justice White suggested that it might be
appropriate for a legislature, but not the Court,
to decide that a suspect should not be consulted
during a criminal investigation, for such a rule
0 Id. at 208, 209.
61 See n. 43, supra.
62378 U. S. 478, 492 (1964).
3Id. at 486.
14 Id. at 496.
Is Id. at 498.
66 Id. at 496.
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"can find no home in any of the provisions of the
Constitution."6 7
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing separately, dissented
on the basis of Cicenia v. Lagay and also said:
"...I think the rule announced today is most
ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiably
fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal
law enforcement". 68
Mr. Justice Stewart, who had written the
Court's opinion in Massiah, said that this case
was different because judicial proceedings had not
been initiated at the time of the interrogation.
For him this was a decisive factor:
"It is 'that factor', I submit, which makes
all the difference. Under our system of crimi-
nal justice the institution of formal, meaning-
ful judicial proceedings, by way of indictment,
information, or arraignment, marks the point
at which a criminal investigation has ended
and adversary litigative proceedings have
commenced. It is at this point that the con-
stitutional gaurantees attach which pertain to
a criminal trial.
6 9
I shall not portend solutions to-nor even pre-
tend to raise-all of the myriad problems which
will inevitably flow from the case of Escobedo v.
Illinois, assuming a certain durability to the new
look on the sixth amendment, but nevertheless
recalling the language of Justice Brandeis, dissent-
ing in Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir,70 that "It is
a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the
process of inclusion and exclusion, so often em-
ployed in developing a rule, is not allowed to end
with its enunciation and that an expression in an
opinion yields later to the impact of facts unfore-
seen." The problems which Escobedo, Massiah and
Gideon suggest are most easily left for future de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
But before that, the scholars will have their turn
to grapple with them within the covers of the law
reviews. The predictable flood of comment has
already begun. The cases are well adapted to the
"sport" of Supreme Court guessing games over
fourteenth amendment requirements for state
criminal procedure, not only within the academic
world of the legal profession but also for the state
courts most directly affected. I do not imply criti-
cism at all of much needed legal scholarship, but
I do criticize the ineffective means we now employ
to identify and attempt to resolve the quagmire
67Id. at 499.
68 Id. at 493.
69 Id. at 493, 494.
of problems arising out of the Supreme Court's
twentieth-century awakening to the fourteenth
amendment as a fountainhead of law applicable
inside of the old boundaries of state criminal cases.
At one time there were two distinct kinds of
criminal cases prosecuted in the United States:
those in the federal courts, governed by federal
law, and those in the state courts, governed by
state law. But we have progressed a long way
towards "federalizing" state criminal procedure
since the old days of Hurtado v. California,7' de-
cided in 1884, Maxwell v. Dow,72 decided in 1900
and Twining v. New Jersey,7' decided in 1908.
Trying cases in the state courts no longer involves
state law, but state-federal law. Before the change
came we had relatively effective machinery for
developing and administering criminal procedure.
In the federal system, still extant, there were
judicial decisions, court rules and the legislation
of Congress. The state systems had their counter-
parts, and they administered criminal justice
through them. But as the state systems of criminal
justice judicially evolved into state-federal sys-
tems, legislation and court rules directly applicable
to the state-federal criminal trial failed to develop
accordingly.
Professor Allen, in TnE BORDERLAND OF CRnU-
70 271 U. S. 609, 619 (1925).
- 110 U. S. 516 (1884), holding the fifth amendment
requirement of grand jury indictments did not apply
to the states. This provision, involving the method of
charging an offense, will probably never be overruled
unless the Bill of Rights some day is held to apply
en toto to the states via the fourteenth amendment, a
view so far held by ten Justices of the Supreme Court,
but never by a majority in one case. See the opinion
of Mr. justice Douglas, concurring in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335, 345-347 (1963).
72 176 U. S. 606 (1900), holding the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee of jury trial does not apply to state
criminal prosecutions. But the Court has held that
when a state does provide a jury trial, the fourteenth
amendment demands that it be a fair one. Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and Turner v. Louisiana,
85S.Ct.546 (1965). Apart from innovations in jury trials,
the question is probably moot since it appears that every
state constitution provides for trial by jury. See Turner
v. Louisiana, supra, at 549, n.9.
7211 U. S. 78 (1908). Twining and Adamson v.
California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), both involving ques-
tions as to whether comment upon the failure of a
state defendant to testify violated the privilege against
self-incrimination, were expressly overruled in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 6 (1964), holding that "the Fifth
Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimi-
nation is also protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against abridgment by the States." And see
Griffin v. California, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4382 (U.S. April
28, 1965), holding that comment on failure to testify
violates the fifth amendment.
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NAL JusTicE, has addressed himself to the problem
I am suggesting, though from a different vantage
point:
"In the area of criminal procedure, no de-
velopment in the recent past is of greater sig-
nificance than the increasing exercise of ju-
dicial supervision over the state systems of
criminal justice by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The expanding definition of
due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment has imposed on the states a new
catalogue of restraints, some of which were
scarcely contemplated as recently as a genera-
tion ago... In the exercise of its supervisory
functions the Court has frequently brought to
public attention deficiencies in state criminal
procedural law and practice and has thereby
opened the way to intelligent local legislative
response. This is of particular importance be-
cause, basically, the problems in the area are
legislative in character. It is becoming increas-
ingly evident that, important as the Court's
role has been and-one may hope-will con-
tinue to be, its function is necessarily a limited
one .... If we are to make further significant
progress toward efficiency and decency, we
shall have to achieve it principally through
legislative initiative. And we shall have to
recognize that the problems are, in the larger
part, not those of the limits of constitutional
power but of policy and common sense."74
And the Supreme Court, as its dissenting members
often freely concede, is not our sole repository for
common sense-and certainly not for efficiency in
the administration of state criminal justice.
The readily traceable reason for the inaction of
Congress and the absence of court rules specially
promulgated by the Supreme Court for the area
of state-federal criminal procedure is the division
of powers between the states and the federal gov-
ernment inherent in our history and emphasized
in the ninth and tenth amendments. The reason
7 At pp. 135-136. As the quotation indicates, Pro-
fessor Allen is speaking about local legislation. Follow-
ing the passage quoted, he says, "It is important to
recognize that the administration of criminal law is
largely a function of local government." (p. 138.)
If, by "administration," Professor Allen means con-
ducting and carrying on, I would agree with him. But if
he means, to use Webster, "administration"-"In its
broadest sense, the activity of the state in the exercise
of its political powers, including the action of the legis-
lative, judicial, and executive departments," I would
agree with him only as to the "state" part of the state-
federal criminal trial the state courts are now ad-
ministering.
rested on bedrock when that division existed and
where it legitimately continues to exist. But when
the reservation of powers of the states in the crimi-
nal area is brought into the penumbra of the
federal system, it is inefficient, foolhardy and con-
trary to our form of government to permit the
federal-fourteenth amendment part of state-federal
criminal procedure to drift forward, backward, or
stand still, exclusively on the pages of the Supreme
Court Reports. Moreover, it is a disservice to make
state law enforcement officials and state courts
flounder in their duties upon a sea of doubt over
which they have no navigable control. If the
states are to operate the state-federal criminal
system, they ought to be allowed to participate in
the full panoply of governmental processes which
control that system-which means legislative
participation as well as judicial imposition. The
resolution of the demands and challenges of the
fourteenth amendment to afford fair criminal pro-
ceedings against the citizen and on behalf of the
state should not be exclusively reposited in the
Supreme Court.
It is, of course, true that the states are left to
their own devices in meeting the dictates of the
Supreme Court. But obedience, even when it is
willing and eager, can be misguided and-when it
comes to operating a system of criminal justice
within a state-grossly inefficient. A recent case
in point is Douglas v. California75 I do not suggest
that we need to find a way to curb the Court. On
the contrary, as to the Court, I suggest that to
supplement its present role in making state-federal
criminal law on a case-by-case basis, it be en-
couraged to perform the further function of pro-
mulgating rules which would be helpful to the
states and lead to greater efficiency in the ad-
ministration of the state-federal law. The scope of
these rules would be within the range of power
75 372 U. S. 352 (1963). The question in Douglas
was whether an indigent convict could be denied the
assistance of counsel on the first appeal. California
set up a procedure under which the District Court of
Appeal made an independent investigation of the
record to determine, preliminarily, whether it would
be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the
appellate court to have counsel appointed. The Su-
preme Court said: "In spite of California's forward
treatment of indigents, under its present practice
the type of appeal a person is afforded ... hinges upon
whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel.
If he can, the appellate court passes on the merits of
his case after having the full benefit of written briefs
and oral arguments by counsel. If he cannot, the appel-
late court is forced to prejudge the merits before it can




generally conceded to appellate courts administer-
ing laws over which they have jurisdiction.
Professor Allen's point is sound that many of
the problems of fair and decent criminal procedure
are, apart from those of the limits of constitutional
power, ones of policy and common sense. And
legislative initiative on the local level should not
preclude legislation for the local level by a con-
glomerate legislature representing thousands of
localities and fifty states with common local prob-
lems under the fourteenth amendment. If the
Congress is intelligently advised, perhaps through
a Committee on State-Federal Criminal Law with
local sub-groups, legislation meeting the demands
of decency and efficiency to the citizens prosecuted
and the state as law-enforcer could be passed and
included in a title to the United States code recog-
nizing and implementing the existing, growing
body of state-federal case law under the fourteenth
amendment.
The relationship of the states to the federal
government in this area has understandably, but
needlessly, been a touchy subject. Fourteenth
amendment doctrine has been developed by the
Court under a tip-toe method which the states
have found leaves the scuff-marks of the big boot.
The Supreme Court, while reassuring the states of
exclusive jurisdiction in procedural matters con-
cerning the operation of state systems of criminal
justice, at the same time dictates requirements
under the fourteenth amendment which generally
affect the most important aspects of criminal
procedure followed within the states. Consider the
then thought to be reassuring language of Mr.
Justice Burton in Bute v. Illinois, a 1948 decision
following the now discarded rule of Betts v. Brady:
"The Fourteenth Amendment... does not
say that no state shall deprive any person of lib-
erty withoutfollowing thefederal process of law
as prescribed for the federal courts in compar-
able federal cases.*** Thisdue process is not an
equivalent for the process of the federal courts
or for the process of any particular state. It has
reference rather to a standard of process that
may cover many varieties of processes that are
expressive of differing combinations of his-
torical or modern, local or other judicial stand-
ards, provided they do not conflict with the
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and politi-
cal institutions' .... This clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment leaves room for much of
the freedom which, under our Constitution of
the United States and in accordance with its
purposes, was originally reserved to the states
for their exercise of their own police powers
and for their control over the procedure to be
followed in criminal trials in their respective
courts 6
One of the questions raised by Escobedo v. Illinois
is whether a person under police interrogation is
entitled to be affirmatively advised that he has
a right to counsel, or whether the suspect waives
that right by failing to request counsel. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recently put two decisions
(Escobedo and Carnley v. Cochraine) together
and voided a confession to murder committed
within the walls of San Quentin Prison with an
opinion which at least causes one to wonder
whether the court based its decision on reasoned
judgment or feelings of awesome benevolence re-
sulting from a misconception of its role as a state
court in the adjudicative process of federal con-
stitutional rights:
"The defendant who does not ask for coun-
sel is the very defendant who most needs coun-
sel. We cannot penalize the defendant who,
not understanding his constitutional rights,
does not make the formal request and by such
failure demonstrates his helplessness. To re-
quire the request would be to favor the defend-
ant whose sophistication or status has fortui-
tously prompted him to make it."78
71 333 U. S. 640, 649, 650 (1947). One does better,
perhaps, when he catches the Justices speaking off the
cuff. Justice Clark recently quoted Leviticus 24:22,
" 'Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the
stranger as for one of your own country.' Evolving
'one manner of law' from the Sixth Amendment's
'assistance of counsel' clause has been as slow as Job's
Tortoise and twice as tough." Clark, The Sixth Amend-
ment and The Law of The Land, 8 ST. Louis U. L. Rv.
(1963).
'369 U. S. 506 (1962), holding in a non-capital
felony case, where defendant is entitled to counsel
under the Belts formula, that waiver of counsel will
not be presumed unless the record shows that the de-
fendant was offered counsel and thereafter under-
standingly rejected the offer.
78 People v. Dorado, 398 P. 2d 361, 369-370 (Cal.
1965). One might think about the California court's
decision in light of the remarks of Mr. Justice Brennan
in his address, Some Aspects of Federalism, delivered
to the Conference of Chief Justices, New York City,
Aug. 7, 1964 (unpublished), at 4-5: "Of course, the
state courts also have a duty to decide issues of federal
law that are raised in cases before them. As our Court
has said [Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637,1 the
obligation rests 'upon the State courts, equally with the
courts of the Union ... to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the Constitution of
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The Supreme Court of Oregon has also held
that the effective warning of both the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel is a necessary
prerequisite to the validity of a confession." And
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, following the
rationale of the California and Oregon courts,
thought that the Escobedo decision made it "clear"
that a defendant merely requested by police to go
to the police station for questioning must be ad-
vised, at the time of the request, that he has a
right to the assistance of counsel and a right to
remain silent.80
Another view, however, is that taken by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, which said:
"We do not... read the Escobedo case as
requiring the rejection of a voluntary confes-
sion because the State did not affirmatively
caution the accused of his right to have an
attorney and his right to remain silent before
his admission of guilt.""
And many other state courts have followed the
rationale of the Supreme Court of Illinois.n
the United States .... ' Indeed, state courts have often
been notably perceptive and forthright, and have led
the way for the federal courts. Some state courts, how-
ever, have taken a different approach; they have seemed
reluctant to test state authority against the Federal
Constitution, apparently feeling that the pronounce-
ment that federallaw prevails over state law is not for a
state court to make. For the United States Supreme
Court, in these cases of federal-state issues that are
so often not only important but also controversial
and emotion-laden, there is no such easy way out-in
President Truman's words, 'The buck stops here'."
79 State v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore. 1965).
"0 State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
81 People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ill.
1964). The Illinois court also said, "In the Escobedo
case, the United States Supreme Court held that a
refusal of a request to consult with counsel, coupled
with a failure to warn the accused of his right to re-
main silent, amounted to a denial of the 'Assistance of
Counsel'... . In the present case the trial court con-
sidered testimony of the failure to warn the accused,
and there is no evidence that the defendant requested
the assistance of counsel. Under all the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case [note the "facts and circum-
stances" rule in action] we hold that the failure to warn
the accused did not compel a rejection of the confes-
sion."
2 See State v. Kitashiro, 397 P. 2d 558 (Hawaii
1964); State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964);
Hayden v. State, 201 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964); State
v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); Carson v. Com-
monwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964); Anderson v.
State, 205 A.2d 281 (Md. 1964); Bean v. State, 398
P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Vigliano, 203 A. 2d
657 (N. J. 1964); Pece v. Cox, 396 P.2d 422 (N.M.
1964); State v. Stinson, 139 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. 1965);
Commonwealth v. Coyle, 203 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1964);
Turner v. State, 384 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1964); Ward v.
Commonwealth, 138 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1964); Browne
v. State, 131 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1964).
Perhaps the following statement of a New York
trial judge, however, more candidly indicates the
friction between the state and federal courts aris-
ing out of the "handcuffing" of the states in the
new state-federal criminal procedure:
"It may well be that the conclusion of the
Supreme Court of the State of California [in
Dorado] ... will be the ultimate indisputable
determination of the United States Supreme
Court if the question reaches that Court, as
it is now constituted, but until there has been
an appellate ruling to the contrary, which is
binding upon the court, I will continue to rule
that, unless counsel is requested, a confession
or a statement made by a defendant under
the circumstances here present is admissible
against him, and that he need not be cautioned
that anything he says will be used against
him."
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And in a recent case from Tennessee, where a
confession dearly had to be excluded under direct
application of the Escobedo rule, we find rancor in
addition to candor:
"The trial judge in colloquy between him-
self and counsel for the defendant at one point,
after an objection had been made to the oral
confession, among other things said:'.., and
this court is not going to be bound by what
the Federal courts have said about it.' Of
course, a statement of this kind is rather un-
fortunate in a record, and should not have
been made, because all of us know that in tak-
ing the oath of office to act as a judge we take
the oath to abide by the Constitution of the
United States as well as the Constitution of
the State of Tennessee.... The Supreme
Court of the United States has passed on ques-
tions as here presented and their decisions on
such questions is mandatory on us. It is oblig-
atory on all State judges to follow such a
directive."'
Can it really be said that the problems con-
fronting the California, Oregon, Rhode Island and
Illinois Supreme Courts, the New York trial judge,
the one from Tennessee and, no doubt, hundreds of
other trial judges, are "local" problems? Are
there "varieties of processes" open to the state
courts to be divined out of their own local, his-
torical or modern settings-the fifty separate
precincts-to comport with "this due process"
13 People v. Agar, 33 U. S. L. VEEK 2247 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1964).
14 Campbell v. State, 384 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tenn. 1964).
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which, it is said, is not an equivalent for federal
process or the process of any given state? Is the
question whether a man charged with misdemeanor
is entitled to appointment of counsel, a question
left over from Gideon, a "local" question, assuming
the man's indigency? Is whether a man suspected
of, say, murder entitled to be provided with a
free lawyer if he is poor and wants one during
police interrogation, a "local" question? Is whether
Escobedo should be made to apply retrospectively
subject to "local" resolution? Or whether we
should do away with the voluntary confession
altogether? Or what rights a man ought to be
told he has before we elicit a confession from him?
Or just how to go about "effectively" telling him
about those rights? These questions could be posed
for quite some time before one got down to the
really "local" issues: how to charge an offense, as
long as one is intelligibly charged; how to provide
counsel, as long as counsel is provided; how to
provide appellate review of convictions, as long
as it is open to all; how to conduct a post-convic-
tion hearing, as long as there is a hearing; and
how to conduct a criminal trial, as long as it is
conducted fairly. The local and the national pro-
cedures can be sorted out for quite some time,
and this is the hub of what I propose we do; not
just by a majority, but by the fifty states through
the Congress.
Until the Supreme Court of the United States
articulates answers to these questions, law enforce-
ment officials will continue to perform their duties
as they see them. There is no mysterious process
at arriving at the answers that makes the Supreme
Court more fit to articulate them than the Con-
gress. There is nothing inherent in our system,
other than Congressional lethargy, some lack of
imagination, the force of legislative inertia at rest,
and the willingness to pass the buck to judicial
interpolation, that restricts Congress from legis-
lating fourteenth amendment requirements for
state criminal processes.
We do not have to nationalize the criminal pro-
cedure of the several States. But we do have to
"fourteenth amendmentize" their procedure. And
the code of fourteenth amendment criminal pro-
cedure that we have to start thinking about cannot
be thought about in terms of traditional procedural
codes. For the code that will have to be worked
out with all of the originality that went into draft-
ing the Constitution does not now exist. To be
sure, the Congress will have to draw on the best
talent in this nation to do the sorting-out and,
indeed, the drafting. The statesmen will have to
be assembled. For until the job is done, with the
full participation of the states, we are going to
keep hearing statements like the one of the trial
judge from Tennessee, and someone is going to
feel the pinches of those statements.
We do not have to search very far for the answer
to the question: does the Congress have authority
to enact legislation for the federal part of the
state-federal trial that the states are now admin-
istering? Section five of the fourteenth amendment
states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." Mr. Justice Strong, construing this pro-
vision for the Supreme Court of the United States
in Ex Parte Virginia,85 stated:
"It is the power of Congress which has been
enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce
the prohibitions by appropriate legislation.
Some legislation is contemplated to make the
amendment fully effective. Whatever legisla-
tion is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in
view.., is brought within the domain of con-
gressional power.
"Nor does it make any difference that such
legislation is restrictive of what the State
might have done before the constitutional
amendment was adopted. The prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restric-
tions of State power. It is these which Con-
gress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce
against State action, however put forth,
whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of
State sovereignty. No law can be, which the
people of the States have, by the Constitution
of the United States, empowered Congress to
enact."
That the concept of section five of the fourteenth
amendment as stated in Ex Parte Virginia still
has vitality is borne out by a 1961 decision of the
Supreme Court, where Mr. Justice Douglas, speak-
ing for the Court, said:
"There can be no doubt at least since Ex
Parte Virginia... that Congress has the
power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 6
88 100 U. S. 339, 345-346 (1879).
86 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 171-172 (1961).
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Assuming Congressional authority to enact a
code of fourteenth amendment criminal procedure
applicable to state criminal cases, and further
assuming a desire on the part of Congress to legis-
late with a genuine sensitivity to concepts of fair-
ness developed by the Supreme Court and those
still being debated in chambers, such a code could
contribute substantially to the efficient and sound
administration of criminal justice in the United
States. Congressional participation potentially
offers a greater degree of certainty and predic-
tability for state systems of criminal justice. It
offers a wider forum for resolution of important
problems confronting the administration of crimi-
nal justice, including the opportunity for Congress
to solicit the reasoned judgment of members of
the state judiciary on important constitutional
problems confronting the nation-not just the
judiciary.
Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Supreme
Court of Illinois has said that "[s]uperimposed
upon the recency of many of our procedural safe-
guards is the novelty of federal intervention in
the field."7 Since Justice Schaefer made that
statement in 1956 the "novelty" has begun to wear
off. Nevertheless we remain lulled by the sense of
transiency that goes with novelty. The Supreme
Court, standing at the summit of our constitutional
system, will continue to intervene on a case-by-case
basis so long as we-through our Congress-con-
tinue to default in our responsibilities to provide
uniform machinery to meet the ever-evolving de-
mands and challenges of the fourteenth amend-
ment. But if we use it, there is reason to believe
the Court will heed our common sense.
87 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1956).
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